#Drivedx mac m1 mac os#
#Drivedx mac m1 free#

#Drivedx mac m1 mac os#

you're not prepared to run an install of Mac OS on your internal drive with SIP disabled (which I presume is the security setting they're being required to downgrade), you need to check the health of those SSDs regularly you run a production line on a Mac which uses external SSDs I mean it's a pretty limited use case, isn't it? The author is basically saying that if: The disk health and integrity doesn't ensure the data integrity either as it may fail after the health is checked so the validation should be done at a higher level (sha256 the whole migration before and after etc)

YMMV but the problem here may be using the wrong analysis tool or the wrong migration approach. It doesn't report it in disk utility but does on the terminal. Now worthy of mentioning here, brew installed smartmontools does report SMART status fully on my 970 EVO in the cheapest USB-C enclosure on amazon. And of course at this point you have to break the secure boot chain by loading kexts that can intercept the disk traffic. DriveDx is being used to circumvent that issue by I assume intercepting the commands and forwarding them to the drive. This is where you get some reporting and some not. The Mac doesn't give a shit about what's on the other side of the controller. Regarding USB / TB external disks, they do support SMART but only if the controller does forward the info to the Mac. Yes aware of that but looking at it from an XY perspective it looks like the thing escalated from the approach. Microsoft also has the unenviable problem of dealing with shitty OEMs with buggy firmwares that change the PCR values unexpectedly, locking users out of their data and requiring a recovery key.īut your original claim-that physical attack protection is novel to ARM-based Apple devices-is just completely wrong. There are good arguments to be made in favor of the iOS or Mac models (which are slightly different, even to each other). In any case, I’m not saying the Bitlocker design is perfect. You can change the key with one or two commands, or with a GUI, even if you use a Microsoft account to sign in. Microsoft has, I think rightly, calculated that the risk of losing access their data is worse for most users than the risk that the government gets a warrant for their recovery key.Īnd if you want to protect against the government, then it’s really easy to set up Bitlocker to not backup to MS.

#Drivedx mac m1 free#

Secure against what? Security isn’t a free floating quantity, it only exists in relation to particular threat models. So if you try to disable Secure Boot on such a machine, you will be unable to boot or otherwise access that volume (even with another machine) unless you have the BitLocker recovery key. Secure Boot can indeed be disabled, but that will change the TPM PCR values, so assuming a standard BitLocker configuration, the TPM will fail to unlock the BitLocker key. This misunderstands the point of Secure Boot. This tweet is wrong when it claims that Secure Boot does not protect against physical presence attacks. This is why nowadays, if a thief steals your laptop and you had the hard drive encryption with hardware security features on (on Windows, if you set up with a Microsoft Account, this is enabled without any further action by the user), you can feel fairly secure that even a technically savvy thief cannot access your data. Further, they can lock down direct memory access to protect powered-on systems from bypasses to user authentication. They verify the integrity of boot components and are only able to decrypt the system volume if they detect an untampered boot chain.

Macs/iOS devices and PCs-through the Secure Enclave and TPM/Secure Boot/Bitlocker, respectively-offer really good protection against physical access attacks. See my comments in a previous thread:Įxtracting the relevant bits and cleaning them up: Your claim that protection against physical presence is novel to ARM Apple devices is also mistaken.

This tweet has made the rounds, but it’s wrong in its claims about Secure Boot.